

25X1

a. Should the interagency group be chaired by an NIO, with members from CIA and DIA, or should its chairman be a DIA officer and the NIO role be one of providing guidance?

The preferred arrangement—in our view—is that there be a trigger mechanism to call the working groups into play as needed. We would call this a Stemring broup and have it chaired by **** one or the other of the Assistant NIOs, depending on the subject. This is not a big point, just a minor natter at Howie, who seems to be pushing for a solution we don't particularly like and at the same time bowing out of responsibility.

b. Should the group be responsible for maintaining a current set of projections to meet national and departmental consumer needs as they arise, or should it function mainly to guide the preparation of NIE projections at the time of the preparation of the NIEs?

The problem with both b. and c. is the assumption that there can be a "current set of projections to meet national and departmental needs as they arise." Each request for projections will normally have specific considerations to be examined, and the projections will need to be specially constructed around the terms given. What I think underlies the problem is a DIA need for a "best" estimate that goes out ten years and which they can claim is a CIA/DIA coordinated view. We don't like to go out that far with a "best" projection.

d. Should the group, and specifically CIA, share responsibility for the summary tables in the DIPP and register agreement with or dissent from these tables in the DIPP?

I guess we could come to terms with this one in some way, but we need to look carefully at the scope of the summary tables and the number of different forces and weapons systems involved. The wording that expresses agreement and dissent would also have to be carefully done, so that the reader or user of the DIPP doesn't read too much into it. I would something like the following might serve:

"The CIA/DIA Forces Projection Working Group has reviewed the (specific Table reference or force identified) projections and find that they are fully consistent with National Intelligence Issuances concerning technical options available to the USSR (China) and represent both feasible and passible force goals under the circumstances assumed."